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For a Judgment pursuant to Article 78 INDEX #2016-0017
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, ORI #NY016015J  
-against-
TINA M. STANFORD, Chairwoman, 
NYS Board of Parole,  
Respondent.
__________________________________________
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Derrick Patterson, verified on November 19, 2015 and filed
in the Franklin County Clerk’s Office on January 12, 2016.  Petitioner, who is an inmate
at the Bare Hill Correctional Facility, is challenging the March 2015 determination
denying his discretionary parole release and directing that he be held for an additional 24
months.  The Court issued an Order to Show Cause on January 15, 2016 and has received
and reviewed Respondent’s Answer and Return verified on March 9, 2016, including
confidential Exhibit C.  No Reply has been received from Petitioner.
On September 6, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced by the Queens County Supreme
Court, as a persistent felony offender, to an indeterminate term of three and one-half to
seven (3½ - 7) years upon the conviction of Robbery 3rd Degree.  He was received into the
custody of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (hereinafter
referred to as “DOCCS”) on September 20, 2012 and made his initial appearance before
a Parole Board on March 31, 2015.  Following that appearance, Petitioner was denied
discretionary parole release and it was directed that he be held for an additional 24
months.  The parole denial determination reads as follows:
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“Denied hold 24 months.  Next appearance, 3/17.
Despite the Earned Eligibility Certificate, after a review
of the record, interview, and deliberation, the panel has
determined that if released at this time, there is a reasonable
probability that you would not live and remain at liberty
without again violating the law and that your release would
be incompatible with the welfare and safety of society.  Parole
is denied.
Required statutory factors have been considered,
together with your institutional adjustment including
discipline and program participation, your risk and needs
assessment, and your needs for successful reentry into the
community.  Your release plans and any letters of reasonable
assurance are also noted.  More compelling, however, are the
following:
Your serious IO of Robbery 3rd degree together with
your lengthy history of criminal conduct while in the
community.  The IO involved you assaulting a female victim
and stealing her handbag.
The IO also represents a continuation of larcenous and
violent behaviors among others that are a concern to this
panel.
Your positive programming is noted as is your
disciplinary record which can be improved.
Nonetheless, previous terms of incarceration and
community supervision have failed to prevent you from
committing more crimes.
This is your fifth state term.  You have failed while on
parole multiple times previously and were still on parole at
the time of the IO.
Therefore, based on all required factors and the file 
considered, discretionary release at  this time is not appropriate.”
The document perfecting Petitioner’s administrative appeal from the March 2015
parole denial determination was received by the DOCCS Board of Parole Appeals Unit on
April 29, 2015.  On or about September 9, 2015, the parole denial determination was
affirmed.  This proceeding ensued.
Executive Law §259-i(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §§38-f
and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a
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reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined
but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate
is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law.
In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted pursuant to
subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall
require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional record
including program goals and accomplishments, academic achievements,
vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interactions with staff and inmates; ... (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate; ... (vii) the seriousness of the offense with
due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior
to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and
pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement.”
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259-
i(5)) unless there had been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety.  See
Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470; Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119
AD3d 1268; Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908 and Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614. 
Unless the Petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary,” the Court must
presume that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with
statutory requirements.  See Jackson v. Evans, 118 AD3d 701, Nankervis v. Dennison, 30
AD3d 521 and Zane v. New York State Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848.
The Petition focuses upon the argument that the Parole Board failed to adequately
consider/properly weigh all of the required statutory factors and instead relied excessively
on the nature of the crimes underlying Petitioner’s incarceration as well as his prior
criminal record.  In this regard, Petitioner specifically alleges as follows:
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“In the present case, Mr. Patterson was convicted of a felony.  He
had a prior felony record. He has had only a minor record of disciplinary
violations while incarcerated.  His prior record, however, is outweighed
by his significant accomplishments while incarcerated and his positive
COMPASS (sic) report.  He demonstrated concretet (sic) plans upon
release. 
In this case as in the King case, the board failed to consider the
statutory factors in a fair manner.  First, it spent the vast majority of the
hearing emphasizing the details of Mr. Patterson’s crime and his prior
criminal record.  Second, it is readily apparent that the board
disregarded or willfully ignored all of the progress Mr. Patterson has
made while incarcerated.  This is a clear addiction (sic) of their statutory
responsibility.  Third, the board failed to note Mr. Patterson’s release
plans or ask questions to the affect of his release plans.” (Petition, ¶18-
19).
To the extent Petitioner purports to rely on King v. New York State Division of
Parole, 190 AD2d 423, aff’d 83 NY2d 788, the Court finds such reliance to be misplaced. 
In King, the Appellate Division, First Department, not only determined that the Parole
Board improperly considered matters not within its purview (penal policy with respect to
convicted murders) but also that the Parole Board failed “to consider and fairly weigh all
of the information available to them concerning petitioner that was relevant under the
statute, which clearly demonstrates his extraordinary rehabilitative achievements and
would appear to strongly militate in factor of granting parole.”  Id. at 433.  The appellate-
level court in King went on to note that the only statutory criterion referenced by the
Board in the parole denial determination was the seriousness of the crime underlying Mr.
King’s incarceration (felony murder of an off-duty police office during the robbery of a fast
food restaurant).  According to the Appellate Division, First Department, “[s]ince ... the
Legislature has determined that a murder conviction per se should not preclude parole,
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there must be a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent
seriousness of the crime itself.” Id. at  433.
This Court (Supreme Court, Franklin County) first notes that Mr. King had no prior
contacts with the law. Id. at 426.  Petitioner, on the other hand, previously served four (4)
separate terms of incarceration with DOCCS and, in fact, committed in the instant offense
while on parole release.  In addition, although the King court did not reference Mr. King’s
disciplinary record, it characterized his overall prison record as “exemplary.”  Id. at 425. 
The parole denial determination in King, as quoted by the Appellate Division, First
Department, described Mr. King’s institutional adjustment as “excellent.”  Id. at 430.  In
the case at bar, however, Petitioner’s prison disciplinary record, as alluded to in the March
2015 parole denial determination, includes three Tier II infractions and one Tier III
infraction for fighting.  It is clear, therefore, that the March 2015 parole denial
determination was not based exclusively on the nature of the crimes underlying
Petitioner’s incarceration but, rather, was also based on his record of prior violent felony
offenses and his less than stellar prison disciplinary record despite the short period of
time he had been incarcerated on the instant offense.
In any event, in July of 2014, the Appellate Division, Third Department - whose
precedent is binding on this Court - effectively determined that the “aggravating
circumstances” requirement enunciated by the First Department in King does not
represent the state of the law in the Third Department.  See, Hamilton v. New York State
Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268.  In Hamilton, it was noted that the Third Department
“has repeatedly held - both recently and historically - that, so long as the [Parole] Board
considers the factors enumerated in the statute [Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A)] it is
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‘entitled . . . to place a greater emphasis on the gravity of [the] crime’ (Matter of Montane
v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, 203 (2014), lv granted 23 NY3d 903 (20144) [internal quotation
marks and citations omitted]’”. Id. at 1271 (other citations omitted).  After favorably citing
nine Third Department cases decided between 1977 and 2014, the Hamilton court ended
the string of cites as follows: “... but see Matter of King v. New York State Div. of Parole,
190 AD2d 423, 434 (1993), aff’d on other grounds 83 NY2d 788[1](1994) [a First
Department case holding, in conflict with our precedent, that the Board [of Parole] may
not deny discretionary release based solely on the nature of the crime when the remaining
statutory factors are considered only to be dismissed as not outweighing the seriousness
of the crime.”  119 AD3d at 1272.
Petitioner’s above arguments notwithstanding, a Parole Board need not assign
equal weight to each statutory factor it is required to consider in connection with a
discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to expressly discuss each of those
factors in its written decision.  See Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197; see also Valentino
v Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 and Martin v. New York State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152. 
As noted by the Appellate Division, Third Department, the role of a court reviewing a
parole denial determination
 “. . . is not to assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the
relevant factors, but only whether the Board followed the statutory
1 The Court of Appeals in King only referenced the fact that “one of the [Parole] Commissioners
considered factors outside the scope of the applicable statute, including penal philosophy, the historical
treatment of individuals convicted of murder, the death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, and the
consequences to society if those sentences are not in place.  Consideration of such factors is not authorized
by Executive Law §259-i.”   83 NY2d 788, 791.  The Court of Appeals, however, did not address that aspect
of the Appellate Division, First Department, decision in King holding that a parole denial determination
must be based upon a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the
underlying crime.
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guidelines and rendered a determination that is supported, and not
contradicted, by the facts in the record.  Nor could we effectively review the
Board’s weighing process, given that it is not required to state each factor
that it considers, weigh each factor equally or grant parole as a reward for
exemplary institutional behavior (internal citations omitted).”  Comfort v.
New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, 1296.
In the case at bar, reviews of the Parole Board Report and transcript of Petitioner’s
March 31, 2015 Parole Board appearance reveal that the Board had before it information
with respect to the appropriate statutory factors, including Petitioner’s educational and
therapeutic programming records, COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment Instrument,
sentencing minutes, disciplinary record and letters of support regarding release, as well
as information with respect to the circumstances of the crimes underlying his
incarceration and prior criminal record.  The Court, moreover, finds nothing in the
hearing transcript to suggest that the Parole Board denied the Petitioner an opportunity
to answer questions or provide insight into how and why he believed that he would be a
good candidate for release.  Indeed, the Petitioner was forthright when he indicated that
he understood that his use of narcotics in the past led to his criminal behavior despite
having completed the Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment program in State Prison
at least four times previously.  Petitioner indicated that he had previously failed to apply
what he had learned while incarcerated.  In addition, Petitioner stated that his last offense
occurred when he was 49 years of age and he was 52 at the time of the initial appearance
before the Parole Board.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole Board
failed to consider the relevant statutory factors.  See Pearl v. New York State Division of
Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 and Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828.  Since the requisite statutory
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factors were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of the discretionary
parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the denial
determination in this case was affected by irrationality bordering on impropriety as a
result of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature of the crimes underlying
Petitioner’s incarceration and his prior criminal record (including four previous state
incarcerations for felonies and that the instant offense occurred while he was on parole
for a previous crime).  See Neal v. Stanford, 131 AD3d 1320 and Confoy v. New York
State Division of Parole, 173 AD2d 1014.
Citing Thwaites v New York State Board of Parole, 34 Misc 3d 694, Petitioner next
argues that the Parole Board erred in failing to apply the amended version of Executive
Law §259-c(4) when it considered him for discretionary parole release and, ultimately,
denied such release.  Notwithstanding the fact that the 2011 amendment to Executive Law
§259-c(4) was designated by the legislature as taking effect on September 30, 2011, the
Thwaites court found that the amendment had to be applied retroactively to Mr.
Thwaites’ March 16, 2010 parole denial determination.  In the matter at bar, the
Petitioner’s initial appearance before the Parole Board occurred post-amendment of
Executive Law §259-c(4).  The guidelines directed therein are set forth in 9 NYCRR
§8002.3, as amended effective July 30, 2014.  Although the Petitioner asserts that he will
have served over five (5) years of the 3 ½ to 7 year sentence before he appears for a parole
hearing again, the Parole Board appears to have followed the guidelines as they rely, in
part, upon the Petitioner’s extensive criminal history as well as the nature of the instant
offense. 
The Court also finds that the March 2015 parole denial determination is sufficiently
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detailed to inform Petitioner of the reasons underlying the denial and to facilitate judicial
review thereof.  See Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295 and Ek
v. Travis, 20 AD3d 667, lv dismissed 5 NY3d 862.
Petitioner asserts that the Parole Board failed to consider the COMPAS instrument. 
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that a COMPAS risk and needs assessment instrument
was prepared in conjunction with the discretionary parole release consideration process. 
The COMPAS instrument is part of the record in this proceeding and was specifically
discussed during the course of Petitioner’s March 31, 2015 parole interview, with one of
the Commissioners noting that the COMPAS instrument “noted under the criminal
involvement part it said you were a high risk.2  History of violence was high; prison
misconduct was high.”  Petitioner’s reliance upon the categories wherein he was found to
have a low risk, i.e. risk of felony violence, arrest risk and abscond risk, is misplaced in
consideration of the entire risk instrument.
Although the Appellate Division, Third Department, has determined that a risk and
needs assessment instrument (such as COMPAS) must be utilized in connection with
post-September 30, 2011 parole release determination (see Linares v. Evans, 112 AD3d
1056, aff’d 26 NY3d 1012, Malerba v. Evans, 109 AD3d 1067, lv denied 22 NY3d 858 and
Garfield v. Evans, 108 AD3d 830), there is nothing in such cases, or Executive Law §259-
c(4), to suggest that the quantified risk assessment determined through utilization of the
risk and needs assessment instrument supercedes the independent discretionary authority
of the Parole Board to determine, based upon its consideration of the facts set forth in
2 The actual COMPAS instrument indicated that the score for criminal involvement to be “medium”. 
It is further noted, however, that the instrument noted Petitioner’s likelihood of reentry substance abuse
to be “highly probable.”
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Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), whether or not an inmate should be released to parole
supervision.  The “risk and need principles” that must be incorporated pursuant to
Executive Law §259-c(4), while intended to measure the rehabilitation of a prospective
parolee as well as the likelihood that he/she would succeed under community-based
parole supervision, serve only to “assist members of the state board of parole in
determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision.”  Thus, while the
Parole Board was required to consider the COMPAS instrument when exercising its
discretionary authority to determine whether or not Petitioner should be released from
DOCCS custody to community-based parole supervision, it was not bound to consider
only by the favorable quantified results of the COMPAS assessment.  The Parole Board
clearly considered the COMPAS results in conjunction with its independent assessment
of the factors set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) including, as here, the serious
nature of the crimes underlying Petitioner’s incarceration, his prior record of violent
felony offenses and his prison disciplinary record.  See Rivera v. New York State Division
of Parole, 119 AD3d 1107 and Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc 3d 896, aff’d 117 AD3d 1258, lv
denied 24 NY3d 901.
The Petitioner asserts that the Parole Board’s determination of a 24 month hold
was excessive insofar as the Petitioner will have served over five (5) years of his 3 ½ to 7
year sentence before he will be eligible for parole review.  In light of the foregoing factors
discussed relative to the Petitioner’s previous criminal history, including the instant
offense occurring while he was on parole release for a previous felony sentence, the
Board’s imposition of a 24 month hold is not unduly excessive.  See Shark v. New York
State Division of Parole, 110 AD3d 1134, 1135, lv dismissed 23 NY3d 933; see also Smith
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v. New York State Division of Parole, 81 AD3d 1026.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.
Dated: June 7, 2016 at
Indian Lake, New York. __________________________   
           S. Peter Feldstein
   Acting Supreme Court Justice  
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